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ABSTRACT 
 
According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the natural gas 
consumption in the US was 1,726 billion cubic feet in January 2013, and the demand has 
been increasing rapidly around the world as natural gas becomes the fuel of choice for 
electric power providers. In order to supply this demand, the US economic interest was 
focused on the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import terminals installation. However, 
since 2009, due to dramatic changes in gas production and economy the US has become 
a net exporter of natural gas. 
The interest for minimizing the negative consequences associated with LNG 
terminals has emerged by focusing on the potential damages that may be generated by 
the flammable and cryogenic characteristics of LNG such as vapor cloud, flash fires, and 
pool fires. 
  LNG research and regulation have been successfully applied for providing safer 
conditions at the LNG import terminals. However, the integration of export terminals 
into the existing LNG network requires a thorough revision of the new challenges 
imposed by the specific conditions related to the liquefaction facilities. 
It is intended to determine the exclusion zones for these two particular scenarios through 
the utilization of PHAST in order to estimate the areas where people, property, or the 
environment would be more severely affected. A revision about the parameters proposed 
by the normativity for the estimation of the exclusion zones, in contrast to the particular 
conditions that might affect the plants located on coastal areas is performed. 
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Additionally, this project seeks to integrate the predicted consequences into real 
world scenarios by including the implementation of a Geographic Information System 
(GIS). The georeferenced data will to identify the potential vulnerable areas located near 
to the LNG facilities.  
The main goal intended in this project by the combination of these two 
computational tools (PHAST model and GIS) is to reduce the gap between the 
consequence estimation of LNG catastrophic events and the incorporation of these 
results in a real world environment.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 LNG history 
 Historical evidence suggests that natural gas was used in China in AD 100 for the 
extraction of salt from saltwater. The production of salt was required for the preservation 
of alimentary products and leather processing.  
In more recent history, when oil drilling started to gain popularity, gas was found 
in some wells. In these cases, the wells were abandoned due to the absence of oil. At that 
time the natural gas was considered unusable, and also was seen as a dangerous 
substance with unpredictable and unsteady characteristics. On the other hand, the 
manufactured gas started its development around the same time during the early 1800’s.  
In contrast to the natural gas, manufactured gas was recognized as predictable, 
containable, and able to cover the demand where it was needed without the negative 
implications derived from transportation issues.  
However, the manufactured gas high production cost represented a major 
obstacle that restrained the growth of this industry. In a parallel case, the oil industry 
continued its consolidation throughout the second half of the 1800’s.This scenario 
enhanced the applicability of the previously assumed waste product, natural gas, for the 
boilers that were used on the drilling and pumping oil operations.  
Due to the cheap price of natural gas, the coal that had been used for operating 
the pump engines was relegated to a secondary position. Around the 1880’s a substantial 
number of companies located in Pennsylvania began to replace the use of coal for 
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natural gas in the production of pottery, iron, and glass. About a hundred wells were 
drilled in the Appalachian region in order to provide gas for domestic and industrial 
uses, and a pipeline for distributing gas to Pittsburgh on an extensive scale was built.  
The natural gas industry continued with its development by addressing three 
major aspects such as production, delivery, and distribution systems. Influenced by the 
industrialization of the United States, the energy demand remained increasing during this 
period.  
In the year of 1940, Howell Cooper, the president of Hope Natural Gas put in 
practice a method for storing natural gas in liquid state.  
This solution solved the problems related to extensive use of pipelines and large 
containers. This innovation established the foundations for the modern natural gas 
industry [1].  
 
1.2 Global energy market 
In the year of 2014 a total of 241.1 MT of LNG were traded. This record 
corresponds to the second largest amount of LNG just behind the post-Fukushima period 
in 2011 where 241.5 MT were exchanged. 
This global LNG market is composed by 19 exporting countries, where eight of 
them are re-exporting cargoes such as Spain, Singapore, and India. The production of 
LNG had been concentrated at the Asia Pacific region until the development of the 
natural gas Qatari industry which has been expanding progressively since the 1990’s. 
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The integration of this new member to the global market has transferred the leading 
LNG role from the Asia Pacific zone to the Middle East.  
According to the world’s LNG records, 41% of the global LNG demand was met 
from the Middle East. There are other developing industries located in the Pacific Basin 
that have contributed to the market dynamics such as Australia, Malaysia, Brunei and 
Indonesia.  
Additionally, Algeria has strengthened its LNG production by integrating new 
liquefaction trains. These new trains have increased the process efficiency.  On the other 
hand, 29 countries belong to the group of LNG importers.  
The global demand has being led by the Asia and Asia Pacific market which has 
imported 75% of the global LNG traded. Countries such as Japan and South Korea rely 
entirely on the LNG imported in order to meet their natural gas demand. In South 
America, Brazil has increased the importation of LNG as a consequence of severe 
droughts [3]. 
 
1.3 US LNG history 
   In recent years, the energy demand has been fulfilled mostly by the consumption 
of fossil fuels such as petroleum, coal, and natural gas. These fossil fuels have covered 
the 87% of US energy demand during the last decade [2]. 
During the last century, the United States has exported natural gas via pipeline to 
Mexico and Canada. The amount of natural gas exported has been less than the 
imported. The only LNG export terminal of domestic production that has been operating 
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since 1969 is the Kenai LNG Plant located in Alaska which has been exporting liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) primarily to Japan. By 2000 the U.S. was committed on a 
consolidation process of supplying the natural gas demand by importing LNG. 
Forecasting reports presented in 1999 by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
stated that natural gas imports were going to growth from 12.9% to 15.5% for the period 
of 1997 to 2020 [3]. Based on these reports, five new LNG import terminals were built, 
and some others existing facilities went through expansion modifications.     
However, the abundant production of natural gas during the last decade has 
changed the economic interests of the American industry. The natural gas profusion has 
been stimulated by the progress on drilling technologies such as “fracking”, which have 
simplified the extraction process of this natural resource. As a consequence of the rapid 
growth of domestic natural gas production most of the existing import facilities became 
unproductive. 
 According to the most recent forecast studies performed by the EIA, it is 
expected that by 2016 the US will become in an overall net natural gas exporter. The 
predictions anticipate that US will be located in third position of largest liquefaction 
capacity by 2020 after Australia and Qatar [3].  
Around 50 permit applications for the construction of new LNG export terminals, 
or for the modification of existing import terminals have been received by January 2015. 
Four of the already approved and under construction LNG export projects are oriented to 
integrate liquefaction facilities to the already existing import terminals, which are known 
as brownfield projects.  
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The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is the agency responsible for 
approving the permits for these projects by the assessment of the potential damages 
(societal and environmental) that may derive from the facilities operations [4]. 
One of the main concerns of the US government is response that will have the 
domestic gas prices due to the LNG exports. On this regard, the government hasn’t 
imposed ceiling limits on the amount of LNG that will be traded. 
 
1.4 US LNG infrastructure 
   The LNG infrastructure consists of interrelated facilities that cover the process 
and transportation of natural gas from the well to the final consumer. Each of these 
plants, equipment, and transportation modes involve particular challenges related to the 
specific physical characteristics of the hazardous materials associated with the different 
stages on the LNG value chain [5]. 
The three major elements of the LNG infrastructure are: tanker ships, storage tanks, and 
the terminals. 
 
1.4.1 LNG tanker ships 
The transportation of LNG is done by specially designed tanker ships that have 
large capacities. These tankers are double hulled containing a vast amount of cryogenic 
tanks. These tanks are sealed and insulated in order to keep the cryogenic material at low 
temperatures, and also are designed to prevent any release of hazardous substances 
during transportation operations. 
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 1.4.2 LNG terminals  
The LNG cargoes start and complete the trips at import or export terminals where 
the LNG is processed, load, and unload.  
These facilities have docks, LNG processing trains, storage tanks areas, and the 
connections to the natural gas pipelines network. 
The seven terminals operating around the US are: Everett, Lake Charles, Cove Points, 
Elba Island, Gulf of Mexico, Peñuelas, and Kenai. 
 
Everett, Massachusetts 
This terminal is located by the Mystic River from Boston. The tankers 
approaching this terminal must go through the Boston Harbor in order to arrive at the 
unloading dock. This was the first import terminal that started operations in 1971. The 
terminal is operated by a Belgian company, and provides natural gas to the New England 
residential consumers as wells as some power producers. During the year 2004, 66 LNG 
shipments were received in this terminal. 
 
Lake Charles, Louisiana 
This terminal is located nine miles from the city of Lake Charles in the Gulf of 
Mexico. The operations at this terminal started in 1981, and received 59 shipments 
during 2004. During that year, the capacity of the terminal was expanded and it was 
available for receiving 175 shipments since the 2006. 
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Cove Point, Maryland 
The terminal is located on the Chesapeake Bay next to the city of Lusby about 60 
miles from Washington, DC. The terminal is operated by Dominion Corporation, and 
started operations in 1978.  
Due to low domestic prices, the terminal had to close in 1980. Seventeen years later the 
terminal reopened to liquefy, store, and distribute natural gas to the domestic consumers. 
Import activities were reestablished by 2003 and 77 LNG shipments were received in 
2004.  
 
Elba Island, Georgia 
The facility is located on a marsh island five miles from Savanna in Georgia by 
the Savannah river. The initial operations were established in 1978, and stopped by 
1980. In about 2001 the terminal returned to operations. In 2004 the terminal received 41 
LNG shipments. The terminal was expanded and the storage capacity increased to 118 
shipments per year. 
 
Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana 
The terminal was built in 2004 and by 2005 the first LNG shipment was 
received. This terminal has an offshore gas pipeline buoy system. This buoy system 
receives the shipment from special ships that regasify their cargoes on board. The 
expected capacity in 2006 was 60 LNG shipments per year. 
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Peñuelas, Puerto Rico 
The terminal located by the south coast of the island started production in 2002. 
The facility is responsible for 20% of Puerto Rico’s electric power generation. 
EcoElectrica owns both the terminal and the electric power plant and by 2004 the 
terminal received 14 LNG shipments in 2004. 
 
Kenai, Alaska 
The facility was completed by 1969, and is the oldest LNG export terminal in the 
US. This facility was built for exporting LNG to Japan. The plant is owned by Phillips 
Petroleum and Marathon Oil, and is located near the Cook Inlet gas fields close to the 
city of Nikiski. The average production rate since 1969 has been 34 LNG shipments per 
year. 
 
On the other hand, there are some offshore terminals that are connected by 
underwater pipelines to land. An advantage of the offshore terminals is the fact that it 
does not represent risks to the public because they are located far from land. As result, 
this type of plants would lead to fewer negative consequences than those related to 
onshore facilities. 
One of the potential damages of offshore terminals is environmental damage. 
The facility uses sea water for regasification process, and the water may generate 
negative effects on the surrounding ecosystem due to the lower temperatures.     
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2. LNG BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Natural gas 
   The main component of natural gas is methane with a combination of other 
hydrocarbons such as ethane, propane, butane, pentanes, and heavier hydrocarbons. 
Natural gas is classified as conventional or unconventional according to the rock type 
where it is found and the trapping mechanism.  
Conventional gas is found in very porous formations that can be drilled vertically 
allowing the flow of gas to the surface. Oil is usually found in these types of wells. The 
natural gas extracted from these reservoirs contains liquids, and other components that 
must be processed in order to isolate the natural gas from liquids and contaminants. 
On the other hand, the unconventional natural gas deposits are characterized by 
lower resource concentration and large areas. These types of deposits require well 
stimulation such as hydraulic fracturing (HF) in order to extract the natural gas. The 
natural gas that is trapped in an impermeable rock that prohibits its flow and subsequent 
formation of a conventional gas deposit is classified as unconventional gas. Some of the 
unconventional gas classifications are shale gas, tight gas, coal bed methane, and 
methane hydrates. Shale gas and tight gas are commonly found at a distance of two 
kilometers or more. Hydraulic fracturing, which is the process of pumping fluid into the 
geologic formations in order to increase the rock permeability is required for the gas 
production from these deposits. 
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2.2 LNG properties 
   The properties of LNG fluctuate depending on the extraction location of the 
original gas. The composition of the natural gas may include water vapor, carbon 
dioxide, nitrogen, and helium, which must be removed at the liquefaction plant.  
Methane’s critical point is -82.75 °C which is the reason why it cannot be 
liquefied at ambient temperature just by pressure. In contrast to liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG, propane, and butane) that can be liquefied by pressure at ambient temperatures, 
methane must be cooled to the boiling point [5]. 
LNG refers to natural gas in its liquid form at cryogenic conditions. As a liquid, 
the natural gas reduces its volume in a ratio of 600:1, which is favorable for storage and 
shipping through long distances by LNG carriers. LNG is manufactured at a liquefaction 
facility and subsequently returned to its gaseous phase at a regasification plant. 
When LNG is spilled, no residues footprint is left behind because it evaporates 
completely. LNG has an expansion factor of 600, which means that natural gas will 
reduce its volume by a ratio of 1:600 when cooled. This allows the transportation of 
natural gas trough far distances by carriers. Natural gas has a molecular weight less than 
the air. When the LNG is released, the vapor cloud that is created will rise in the 
environment in contrast to other heavier hydrocarbons that are heavier than air. Heavier 
hydrocarbons will tend to accumulate at lower zones which make them more difficult to 
dissipate.  In comparison to coal or other liquid hydrocarbons, LNG generates less CO2 
per unit of energy. The flammability limits of vaporized LNG have been estimated as 
LFL = 5%, and UFL = 15% in an air mixture.  LNG vapor air mixture under partially 
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confined or unconfined conditions will not result in detonation.  In order to reach a 
deflagration scenario, a substantial congestion and high ignition energy are required [5]. 
 
2.3 LNG hazards 
   The hazards of LNG can be derived from different sources such as: liquid leaks 
from pressurized equipment, liquid leaks from storage tanks, storage tank rollover, or 
vapor plumes produced from evaporating liquid pools.  The scenario of a pressurized 
liquid leak may occur at the processing plants, and at the pipelines that transport the 
LNG between the storage tanks and the trains (regasification or liquefaction). 
Some of the hazards related to the LNG are: radiation burns, overpressure from 
vapor cloud explosions at highly congested zones, rapid phase transitions, asphyxiation, 
freeze burns, and tank rollovers [6]. 
When the LNG is in direct contact with skin, it can cause freeze burns. Also 
when equipment that is not designed for cryogenic operations is exposed to the low 
temperatures of the LNG, it can be affected by embrittlement effects. In terms of 
environmental damage when the LNG is spilled the consequences are minimal. In 
comparison with crude oil, the LNG does not need remediation for the soils, 
groundwater, or surfaces waters because it will evaporate and dilute in the air under 
atmospheric conditions. An evaporating pool is formed when LNG is spilled on land or 
water, and the vapor cloud will flow driven by the wind.  
A flash fire may occur when the vapor cloud generated by the evaporating LNG 
finds an ignition source. It is unlikely that a flash fire will produce a secondary ignition 
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or that it will burn beyond of the flaming region. A pool fire will be generated when the 
flash fire burns towards the LNG pool, and a pool fire will be developed.  
Based on the experiments that have been carried out in the past for studying the 
reactivity behavior of the LNG, it has been determined that the vapor cloud in outdoor 
conditions would only explode if there are highly congested zones. These highly 
congested zones refer to a large number of obstacles interacting such as pipelines, and 
other equipment. These types of congested zones are common at the liquefaction 
facilities.  
However, the particular characteristics of LNG regarding its low reactivity are 
favorable for minimizing the potential outdoor explosions. Additionally, due to the low 
reactivity characteristics of LNG, it has been determined that detonation explosions are 
almost impossible to be generated. 
As mentioned before, another hazard related to LNG is asphyxiation.  LNG has 
the potential for decreasing the concentration of oxygen in the environment and this will 
lead to negative effects on humans. The symptoms presented on humans may vary from 
impaired behavior, nausea and vomiting, or death depending on the degree of oxygen 
absence. 
The type of concentrations capable for creating these adverse conditions might be 
generated near the spill for an outdoor release. It is very unlikely that the adverse 
conditions for developing an asphyxiation scenario would develop near to the vapor 
plume. It is also unlikely that asphyxiation conditions might be produced due to the 
elevated vapor concentration at occupied indoor spaces. The applicable regulations 
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regarding safety practices at enclosed areas are responsible for minimizing occurrence of 
an asphyxiation scenario [6].  
 
2.4 LNG incident history 
           The LNG industry has an outstanding safety record in comparison with other 
fossil fuel industries. For instance, there have been about 69 firefighters killed in 
incidents related to Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) during the period of 1945 to 2004. 
On the other hand, there are no fatalities reported since the beginning of LNG operations 
in 1941. Three major incidents have occurred in the US since the first facility started 
production in 1941.  
 
2.4.1 Cleveland, Ohio 1944 
In 1939 the first LNG facility (peak-shaving) was built in West Virginia. The 
second commercial LNG facility was built two years later by the East Ohio Gas 
Company in Cleveland. This facility operated under safe conditions until the incident 
occurred in 1944. Due to an attempt for increasing the storage capacity at the facility, a 
larger tank was constructed.  
During the years of the World War II there was not enough stainless steel 
available for building the tank. This design failure was the root cause for the storage tank 
mechanical failure, because the material in contact with the cryogenic temperatures of 
the LNG produced embrittlement damage at the tank’s wall. As a consequence, the LNG 
spilled and overflowed the dike which was designed for a smaller volume release.  
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The liquid spilled flowed into the storm sewer systems located near the process 
area. The LNG contained at the sewer system formed a flammable vapor cloud that filled 
the adjacent streets and then it ignited.  
The outcome of the incident was 128 people killed due to the vapor and pool fire 
that affected the nearby utility company building, and a contiguous residential area. 
The incident investigation performed by the US Bureau of Mines concluded that the 
Cleveland tank design didn’t follow the specifications stated by the regulations. None of 
the LNG tanks that were erected following the Cleveland incident suffered 
embrittlement failures [7].     
 
2.4.2 Staten Island, New York 1973 
An incident occurred at the peak-shaving plant on Staten Island in February 
1973. Employees from the facility identified a potential leak from the storage tank and 
stopped the operations. The content from the tank was emptied, and small pieces of 
mylar lining were found on the tank. 
During the tank rehabilitation, the mylar liner and the polyurethane tank 
insulation were ignited. As a consequence, the temperature increased in the tank, and 
substantial pressure was generated to dislodge a 6-inch thick concrete roof. Then the 
roof fell on the workers, and killed 40 of them. 
The subsequent investigation reported the event as a construction circumstance 
and not as a LNG incident. 
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2.4.3 Cove Point, Maryland 1979 
An explosion at one of the electrical stations from the Cove Point LNG terminal 
occurred in 1979. Due to an inadequately tightened conduit seal from a LNG pump, 
LNG leaked and entered the electrical substation. There were no gas detectors installed 
at the electrical station because the scenario of natural gas entering the building was not 
expected. The flammable mixture was ignited by the electrical ignition sources from a 
motor control circuit. 
The scenario evolved in an explosion that caused the death of one operator in the 
building, and injuries on a second employee. Additionally, $3 million were lost in terms 
of economic damage. 
The incident investigation determined that the Cove Point Terminal followed the 
design and construction standards. For this reason the standards were reviewed, and 
three major design code modifications were integrated [7]. 
  
2.4.4 Skikda, Algeria 2004 
A steam boiler exploded at the liquefaction terminal in Skikda, Algeria, on the 
Mediterranean Sea. This explosion led to the release of flammable vapors from a 
hydrocarbon refrigerant leak into its air intake. A secondary more devastating explosion 
was triggered and destroyed a considerable area of the plant. 
As a consequence of the incident, 27 people died, 74 suffered injuries, and $800 
million were lost. The area outside the facility’s boundaries reported material damages 
due to the fire and explosion effects. No damages occurred at the storage tank area. The 
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plant had been operating for over 30 years before the incident with an outstanding safety 
record. 
The sequence of the events previous to the incident started when an operator 
from the control room detected a rising pressure within the steam boiler. The operator 
tried to solve the problem by reducing the flow of fuel to the boiler. However, the 
pressure relief valve was activated. The released flammable material was drawn into the 
boiler by its air inlet fan.  
The explosion occurred when the flammable mixture ignited at the firebox. A 
flaw in the allocation of equipment led to the incident. The boiler was located near to the 
area where the gas leaked. The initial explosion generated the failure of a pipe that was 
transporting refrigerant hydrocarbon. The lack of wind that would have contributed with 
the dilution of the flammable mixture was one of the contributing factors for this 
incident [7]. 
 
 2.5 Safety regulations for LNG onshore terminals 
There are two agencies responsible for the regulation of the onshore LNG 
terminals. These agencies are the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 
The DOT establishes the safety standards for the onshore facilities involved in 
LNG processing. The safety standards promulgated by this agency include the 49 CFR 
193, “Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards”. This standard defines 
the minimal siting requirements, and also includes guidelines from the NFPA for design 
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and construction of LNG facilities. This guidelines look to preserve the integrity of the 
structures in case of fire, hydraulic forces, and erosion from LNG spills [8]. Other 
aspects discussed in this standard address operations, maintenance, employee 
qualification, and security. 
As stated by the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA), FERC is the agency 
responsible for approving the construction of new onshore LNG facilities. FERC has the 
authority for assessing and approving the siting, construction, and operation of new LNG 
facilities. Also this agency regulates the existing facilities that are planning to be 
modified or extended. 
Some of the FERC regulations indicate the requirements related to detailed site 
engineering and design information that support the facility availability for performing 
LNG processing under safe conditions. FERC is commissioned for evaluating the 
facility’s proposed location. Another function of this regulatory agency is related to 
assessing the environmental impacts that might be derived from the LNG facility. Within 
the environmental assessment some aspects such as facility effects on air and noise 
quality, public safety in case of an incident or malfunction, socioeconomic impact, 
safeguards, and geophysical features of the place are considered. 
An organization that plays an important role for the LNG regulation is the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). This is an international organization that 
is focused on the creation of fire prevention standards. The NFPA 59A:”Standard for the 
Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas” establishes the 
requirements related to siting, design, construction, fire protection, and safety [9].  
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2.6 Evolution of LNG regulations 
The increasing domestic natural gas production has driven the shift in the US gas 
industry from being an LNG importer to become a net LNG exporter. For this reason, 
many companies are trying to implement liquefaction trains at existing LNG import 
terminals. 
The regulations for siting, design, construction and operation of LNG plants are 
established by 49 CFR 193 and NFPA 59A, where the exclusion zones requirements are 
specified. The interpretation of the regulations has been clarified by FERC through 
formal letters. The regulation interpretation has been evolving through the years, and 
new computational tools have been created in order to cover the requirements of the 
regulations.  
The standards that need to be followed in order to receive the permission by 
FERC are: 
 40 CFR 68 – Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions. 
 49 CFR 193 – Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards. 
 NFPA 59A- Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG). 
These standards require the existence of exclusion zones between the LNG and 
refrigerant storage units, processing trains, and transfer areas in order to isolate them 
from probable ignition sources and out of boundary areas. In order to comply with the 
siting requirements established under 49 CFR 193, the facility design must ensure that 
the hazardous zone must not extend beyond the boundary limits [10]. 
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It is established by the regulation that a ½ LFL flammable vapor cloud will not trespass 
beyond the property line for a worst-case release scenario with a 10 minutes time span. 
The cases covered are: 
 Worst-case loss of containment of LNG or refrigerant (spill). 
 Worst-case loss of containment of LNG or refrigerant (jetting and flashing 
release). 
Additionally, an offsite consequence analysis assessing 1 psi overpressure as 
resulting from the ignition of worst-case 10 min releases is required. Also, a limit of 
1,600 Btu/hr/ft
2
 (5,000 W/m
2
) must not be exceeded beyond the facility’s boundary as 
consequence of a pool fire. 
These hazards scenarios are all based on a time span of 10 minutes for releases of 
LNG or flammable refrigerants at the maximum leak flow rate, following the scenarios 
established by FERC for pipe break.   
 
2.7 Vapor dispersion exclusion zones 
The US regulation 49CFR193.2059 for LNG terminals establishes the 
identification of exclusion zones for each LNG container and transfer system in order to 
protect the population located nearby.  
The exclusion zone is calculated by determining the distance to the ½ lower 
flammability limit (LFL) from the downwind edge of the impoundment. As mentioned 
before, the flammability range of LNG goes from 5% to 15%. Therefore the contour of 
the exclusion zone is defined as 2.5% flammable material in the air. 
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Regarding the parameters used by the approved models for determining the 
exclusion zones, the software must incorporate ambient conditions such the atmospheric 
stability, the wind speed at 10 m, relative humidity, and surface roughness. 
 
Table 1. LNG modeling parameters 
Parameter Value 
Atmospheric stability class F 
Wind speed 2.0 m/s 
Relative humidity 0.5 
Surface roughness 0.03m 
 
In case that the surrounding terrain next to the source has dense vegetation, a 
different roughness parameter may be used. Additionally, a different set of temperatures 
might be used when it is checked that these new temperatures produce larger distances in 
90% of the time. 
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3. ONSHORE LNG TERMINALS 
 
3.1 LNG plants 
The natural gas facilities are responsible for processing associated and 
nonassociated gas in order to produce LNG. The quality of the natural gas produced is 
determined by the market specifications. There are several different processes performed 
at the natural gas facilities such as: 
Dehydration of gas helps to minimize corrosion, also to prevent the formation of 
clogs at the pipelines when the materials are under cryogenic conditions. Carbon dioxide 
is separated from the natural gas. In order to minimize the environmental damage, this 
carbon dioxide can be reinjected into the reservoirs. When processing natural gas it is 
required to remove impurities such as H2S in order to make it marketable. 
Liquefaction processing is done for producing the merchandisable liquid output 
or for storing purposes. The natural gas is liquefied in order to allow the product to be 
transported to distant markets. It is common to find these types of facilities located near 
to large gas reservoirs. The first LNG liquefaction facility with exporting capacity was 
the Kenai facility located in Alaska. 
 
3.2 LNG process 
3.2.1 Field operations and inlet receiving 
            The gas processing facilities in most of the cases are interconnected through a 
pipeline network to the field operations. These pipelines provide the raw natural gas to 
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be processed at the plant. Some processes included in the field operations are 
measurement, liquid separation, dehydration, removal of carbon dioxide and hydrogen 
sulfide, and compression. Usually the gas received at the plant comes with residues and 
impurities that must be removed at the initial stage of the facility processing.   
 
3.2.2 Inlet compression 
            It is common to find inlet compression at the natural gas facilities, although in 
some cases the inlet compression might be unnecessary when the inlet streams have 
pressures around the 700 psi. Usually the facilities use a similar type of compressors for 
the inlet, field and outlet activities. Among the energy consumption sources at a gas 
plant, this one represents the major source for energy expenditure [11]. 
 
3.2.3 Gas treating 
            At this stage acid gases (Hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide) along with other 
sulfur pollutants are treated for removal. Water based absorbents are usually used by 
most of the gas processing facilities for removing the impurities; however other solvents 
and processes might be also used. 
 
3.2.4 Dehydration 
            In order to avoid the clogs that might be generated from the gas hydrates, it is 
required to dry the gas. This process also contributes by minimizing the corrosion 
effects. The plants that use water based treating require dehydrating the gas. Usually the 
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gas received at the inlet pipeline contains water excess. Before starting the cryogenic 
process, the water must be eliminated because under low temperatures it can freeze and 
that would represent a critical problem for the pipelines. 
 
3.2.5 Hydrocarbon recovery 
            At this stage in the process, the hydrocarbons are separated. Some of the 
hydrocarbons recovered are used as fuel in the plant and some other are commercialized. 
The mixture of natural gas received at the inlet pipeline may contain different 
concentration of methane and heavier hydrocarbons that require to be separated. 
 
3.2.6 Trace components 
            The mixture from the raw natural gas includes a combination of impurities that 
are required to be removed in order to reach the costumer specifications. These 
impurities come in low concentrations but without the adequate processing the final 
product would be rejected by the buyer. One of the substances that must be removed is 
mercury because it can generate mechanical failure in the aluminum heat exchangers. 
 
3.2.7 Outlet compression 
            Most of the natural gas facilities use turboexpanders for the refrigeration process 
and also for compressing the gas that is sent to the through the pipelines. A portion of 
the work used for recompressing the residue or sales gas comes from the expansion 
process. 
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3.2.8 Liquid processing 
            The natural gas adopts its gaseous state when processed at the liquefaction train. 
The liquefaction process takes into account the specific properties of the received raw 
material, and the final consumer expectations for the product [11]. 
 
3.2.9 Sulfur recovery 
            The ways for disposing the H2S removed from the natural gas depend on the 
amounts of the toxic material and they are: flaring, elemental sulfur conversion, and well 
reinjection. The easiest way to dispose the hydrogen sulfide is by flaring the excess 
amount. However, when the levels of H2S are higher than the emission limits, it should 
be considered to use the conversion of the material into elemental sulfur, or reinject it at 
the well for disposal [11]. 
 
3.3 Integration of liquefaction trains  
3.3.1 Key elements from facility modification 
The rising natural gas domestic production has created new opportunities for 
exporting LNG. As a result of this situation, the established LNG import companies have 
shown their interest for integrating liquefaction trains into their existing regasification 
facilities. 
The benefit for integrating liquefaction equipment into the previously built plant 
lies on the possibility for using available infrastructure such as storage tanks, docks, as 
well as processing expertise, license and market contacts. 
 25 
 
 
However the integration of liquefaction process equipment provides additional 
hazards that must be thoroughly assessed in order to minimize the potential negative 
outcomes. 
Some of the major units that must be installed related to the liquefaction train 
are:  
 Compressors for feed gas and refrigerant. 
 Heat exchangers for precooling feed gas (air or water cooled). 
 Main cryogenic heat exchanger. 
 Hydrocarbon fractionation units. 
 Additionally spill containment systems. 
 Extra electrical power distribution system.  
 Increase the capacity of the firewater systems. 
The main hazards considered for the integration of the liquefaction process in an 
existing LNG import facility are: 
 LNG hazards (common for import and export). 
 Hazards related to the use of hydrocarbon refrigerant, and impurities of natural 
gas received from the inlet pipeline. 
Some of the hazards and design requirements are common to both types of 
facilities (import and export). These hazards are associated with the length of the 
pipeline, and flow rate conditions. When converting the unidirectional flow at the import 
terminals into a bidirectional one, it is common to keep the same flow rate that had been 
used. On the other hand, a significant modification related to the spill containment 
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barriers may need to be done. An extended spill containment system must be integrated 
between the liquefaction train and the storage tank area. 
An updated vapor dispersion analysis must be performed in order to evaluate the 
potential scenarios that would be generated by the integration of other hazardous 
materials (hydrocarbon refrigerants). 
It is required to evaluate and propose updated designs for the overall spill sumps 
containment capacity in order to ensure that the additional chemical compounds would 
be properly contained in case of an incident. 
A different set of materials such as refrigerant hydrocarbons, as well as raw 
natural gas will capture the attention when rerunning the consequence hazard analysis. 
For instance, the vapor dispersion from refrigerants must be identified. Additional gas 
detectors must be installed in order to protect the zones that might be affected by 
flammable vapor clouds. 
  
3.3.2 Vapor handling system 
Modifications regarding vapor handling system must be performed. In the case of 
an import terminal, the compressed gas generated at the boiloff gas is usually sent 
towards the sendout pipeline. On the other hand, for the export terminals the boiloff gas 
is used as part of the facility’s fuel gas system after it is compressed. One of the main 
concerns at the liquefaction plants is to increase the efficiency of the process by limiting 
the generation of BOG. The production of BOG in the liquefaction train must be 
analyzed during the design stage by taking into account the pressure conditions for the 
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storage tanks and process vessels. In order to reduce the generation of BOG, the process 
must keep subcooled conditions that will help to avoid the thermodynamic flash effect 
[12]. 
 
3.3.3 From import to export terminal 
Redefining the operations that take place at the existing LNG terminals will 
represent a series of challenges that must be attended. In case that the number of changes 
would be elevated, it requires a proportional magnitude of modifications to be 
reanalyzed. Keeping the safer operational conditions as possible will be the main 
objective for the modification projects. 
Although several existing equipment, protective barriers, storage tanks would be 
subjected to modifications, a substantial amount of new components might be integrated 
at the LNG facilities. The implementation of an extended operational and maintenance 
program must be established for reaching a successful facility performance. 
In order to comply with standards, the updated designs for the new LNG export 
terminals must be thoroughly analyzed. This is a particular scenario where the 
advantages found on integrating additional processes to an existing facility require the 
implementation of a thorough safety analysis. Just in that way, it would be possible to 
ensure that safe and efficient activities would be performed.      
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4. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Vapor-gas hazard exclusion zone determination 
The federal regulation 49 CFR 193 establishes that any LNG storage tank and 
transfer system located within an LNG plant must have an exclusion zone defined by 
vapor dispersion analysis which are defined by following the prescriptive guidelines 
contained in sections 2.2.3.3 and 2.2.3.4 of NFPA 59A. 
It is specified by the 49 CFR 193 that the exclusion zones must be “an area 
surrounding an LNG facility in which an operator or government agency legally controls 
all activities in accordance with §193.2057 and §193.2059 for as long as the facility is in 
operation”. 
Based on the exclusion zone regulation description, the facility boundary for 
which the vapor dispersion exclusion zone would be enforced is delimited by the fence 
at which the facility operator ceases to control all activities [13]. 
The hazard exclusion zone cannot prolong beyond the facility boundary limits.  
 
 4.2 Defining spill scenarios 
According to NFPA 59A, the design spill must be chosen based on single 
accidental leakage source scenario for the process areas. It is not thoroughly specified 
what a single accidental leakage source involves by the NFPA 59A; however, a list of 
some particular scenarios is provided. Therefore, FERC has presented guidance for 
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selecting single accidental liquid leakage sources to assess in order to support that the 
facility is in agreement with the 49 CFR Part 193. 
4.2.1 Types of leaks 
The releases of flammable materials such as LNG or refrigerants are divided into 
two groups by FERC’s guidance. Both of these categories must be considered for the 
analysis of the exclusion zones. 
4.2.1.1 Liquid spill scenarios 
This scenario considers a full pipe rupture and the consequent liquid spill onto 
the ground. The liquid is released and collected in the trenches, troughs, and 
impoundments. Subsequently, the material released evolves in a vapor cloud that 
disperses in the environment. Then the exclusion zone is defined by the calculated vapor 
cloud. 
4.2.1.2 Pressurized release scenarios 
In contrast to the liquid spill scenarios, this scenario considers the releases where 
no liquid reaches the ground. As these scenarios produce limited or no rainout, they tend 
to generate vapor clouds that cover larger extensions. 
4.3 Prescriptive leak size definition 
FERC has defined the types of leak scenarios required for modeling in order to 
standardize the procedures for assessing single accidental leakage source. 
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Initially FERC established the assessment of all small diameter attachments related to 
the transfer pipelines, pressure reliefs, recirculation, and any flanges that are used at 
valves or other equipment for the estimation of the largest spills. 
This approach was supported by the DOT. As a consequence, a vast range of 
single accidental leakage sources were presented to the FERC by the applicants. 
Then FERC defined more specific criteria for the selection of leaking sources, for piping 
between the range of 100 m and 1000 m length. Full-pipe rupture was established at any 
point along the pipeline for a line equal or less than 6 inches in diameter. 
On the other hand, for a pipe with a diameter greater than 6 inches, a hole size of 
2 inches in diameter, was established. Additionally, a hole equivalent to 1/3 of the pipe 
diameter was defined, for piping greater than 12 inches in diameter. 
 
4.4 Leak size definition 
No quantitative justification was provided for the selection of design spill on the 
introductory prescriptive approach for instructing about a single leakage source. Later 
FERC decided to establish an acceptable failure rate for LNG storage tank outlet line for 
the definition of a quantitative criterion. It was established by FERC that a tank outlet 
line would fail every 20,000 to 30,000 years (5x10
-5
 to 3x10
-5
 failures per year). 
According to this, FERC established the selection of accidental leakage sources when 
the annual likelihood of failure was greater than 3x10
-5
. 
FERC presented a failure rate set for determining the failure likelihood of the 
components found at the LNG processing systems in the plants. Some of the equipment 
 31 
 
 
that must be considered are: transfer and process equipment, process vessels, valves and 
joints, transfer arm and hoses. 
 
 4.5 FERC approved models 
There are different computational tools used for modeling incident releases that 
have been approved by FERC. These vapor dispersion models have been tested against 
the Model Evaluation Protocol established by the Fire Protection Research Foundation in 
2007. 
 
4.5.1 DEGADIS 
According to NFPA 59A Standard for the Protection, Storage, and Handling of 
Liquefied Natural Gas, the distances reached by the flammable mixture must be 
calculated by using the Dense Gas Dispersion Model (DEGADIS).  
This model has been developed by the Gas Research Institute. The prescription 
of this model as the tool for calculating exclusion zones was removed in 2009 by the 
NFPA 59A, and the models were accepted as the approved models under the model 
evaluation protocol.  
This model considers the effects of gravity spreading, negative or positive 
buoyancy, heat transfer from surface to the cloud, and phase change related to the 
humidity in the air for dense gas dispersion. The model was developed by the Gas 
Research Institute in collaboration with the US Coast Guard [13]. 
 
 32 
 
 
4.5.2 PHAST integral model 
This model was authorized by PHMSA in 2011 for the analysis of exclusion 
zones from LNG vapor dispersion. Det Norske Veritas is the company that developed 
this commercial software. PHAST has been extensively used for determining the hazard 
distances from the release of a variety of hazardous substances, and LNG is one of them. 
The Unified Dispersion Model (UDM) is the code used by PHAST as an integral 
model for the dispersion calculation. This code follows a two-phase pressurized release, 
or an unpressurised release. The Unified Model Dispersion allows the calculation for 
continuous, instantaneous, constant finite duration and general time varying releases.  It 
also allows the calculation when the plume lift-off due to buoyant effects. A large 
number of experimental data have been used for validating this software [13]. 
 
4.5.3 FLACS CFD model 
The Model Evaluation Protocol has been used for the validation of FLACS as an 
LNG vapor dispersion model. Extensive experimental data has been used for validating 
this tool. The US DOT received a petition in 2010 looking for the approval of this 
software as an alternative option for LNG vapor dispersion model. By 2011 a final 
decision from the US DOT was presented where the agency approved the use of FLACS 
for calculating the dispersion exclusion zone. 
Among the capabilities of this commercial software, there are the possibilities for 
analyzing vapor dispersion and vapor cloud explosion scenarios. The CFD model solves 
the Navier-Stokes equations for a time dependent input. The model integrates 
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conservation equation for mass, enthalpy, momentum and gas concentration in order to 
provide results represented in a Cartesian grid for a finite volume. 
The software includes liquid spill model that applies the shallow water equation 
in order to calculate the spread of LNG or hydrocarbons on the ground. Additionally, it 
has a pool evaporation model that determines the heat transfer from the ground surface, 
the wind convection effects, and also radiation. 
This is the only software that is able to include the effect of obstacles in the 
modeling of vapor clouds. As a result, the software has been approved for modeling the 
resulting vapor clouds from spills onto trenches [13]. 
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5. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
5.1 Motivation 
The rising production of domestic natural gas in the US during the last decade 
has driven a change regarding the interest for exporting LNG instead of importing it. The 
importation of LNG was thought as a main supply for the national energy demand until 
the beginning of the 21
st
 century. However, the increasing domestic production has been 
stimulated by the development of upstream operations technologies such as hydraulic 
fracturing which has allowed the extraction of this fossil fuel from the extensive shale 
gas formations. 
Around 50 project applications have been received by requesting permits for 
operating LNG export facilities. The existing LNG import terminals that were built 
around the year 2000 have been idle during the last years; for this reason, FERC has had 
special considerations for granting the permit to these existing facilities in order to start 
the brownfield project development in the immediate future.  
The integration of liquefaction trains within the existing LNG import terminals will 
represent additional challenges for the entire safe operation. Hazardous hydrocarbon 
refrigerants that were not included for the import regasification processing, as well as 
toxic impurities derived from raw natural gas represent an increasing overall potential 
negative consequence [16]. 
During the last five years, five import terminals got FERC’s permission for 
construction and operation of export terminals. LNG terminals such as Corpus Christi, 
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Freeport, Sabine Pass, Hackberry and Cove Point have been integrating all the 
equipment related to the liquefaction trains that will be used for starting export activities 
in the close future. 
As the domestic natural gas production keeps increasing the interest for exporting 
this fossil fuel, several project proposals are still under revision by FERC. 
Therefore, studying the parameters established by the NFPA for the calculation of 
exclusion zones seems as a useful analysis. This analysis allows to get a preliminary idea 
of how these modify facilities might affect the nearby populations. 
Additionally, the results obtained from the modeling stage will be represented 
through the implementation of Geographic Information System (GIS). The 
implementation of this computational tool represents an opportunity for contextualize 
the theoretical results into a real world environment (nearby population density, land use 
data, gas pipeline network) [17]. 
 
5.2 Objective 
This research intends to perform a consequence analysis for an LNG terminal 
including regasification and liquefaction processes. The objectives of this study are: 
1)  Calculate the flammable vapor dispersion for a set of hazardous materials used 
in the processing of natural gas at import and export terminals. The set of 
hazardous materials consists of: methane (liquid and gas), propane (liquid and 
gas), carbon dioxide (gas), and mixed hydrocarbon refrigerant (liquid and gas).  
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2) Assess the coastal areas environmental effects related to wind speed and relative 
humidity that might generate a different kind of results in comparison with 
those obtained when using the NFPA regulatory parameters.    
3) Integrate the results in GIS in order to identify the zones outside the facility’s 
boundary that might be under potential damage. 
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6. METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology used for developing this project is explained in the figure 1. 
In order to estimate the exclusion zones required by the NFPA regulation a set of 
different materials at different pressure and temperature conditions has been proposed. 
The subsequent stage is to evaluate different scenarios by modifying particular 
environmental conditions that could be found at the locations of the Cove Point, and 
Sabine Pass LNG terminals. Finally, the results obtained will be integrated into the GIS 
tool in order to identify the populated zones under potential damage. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed research methodology 
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Some of the different hazardous materials that might be found at common 
regasification and liquefaction terminals were modeled by using PHAST where the 
NFPA 59A conditions parameters were used. 
 
Table 2. NFPA 59A parameters [9] 
Parameter Value 
LNG 
Atmospheric stability class 
Methane 
F 
Wind speed 2.0 m/s 
Relative humidity 0.5 
Surface roughness 0.03m 
Ambient Temperature 70 °F 
Release Duration 10 min 
Hole Size (diameter) 0.5” -  2” – 4”  
 
Additionally, for the LNG export terminal the following materials were analyzed 
 
Table 3. Materials analyzed 
Material State Pressure (psi) 
Methane Gas 1000 
Methane Liquid 2.7 
CO2 Gas 15 
Propane Liquid 220 
Propane Gas 103 
MR Liquid 194 
MR Gas 428 
 
MR represents a mixed refrigerant hydrocarbon material that consists of nitrogen, 
methane, ethane, propane, and ethylene. 
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Finally, a parametric analysis has been performed in order to evaluate how much 
influence can be derived from the parameters atmospheric stability, ambient 
temperature, and hole diameters. 
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7. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
  
The results obtained from the simulation performed by using PHAST are 
presented in this section. The initial set of data analyzed was based on the parameters 
established by the NFPA 59A regulation. Two cases were assumed for modeling the 
conditions found at an LNG import terminal. Additionally five other scenarios were 
selected for describing the particular conditions at an LNG export terminal. 
The simulation was run for a horizontal release at the contiguous pipeline 
segment from the equipment. For instance, if LNG is being transported by a pump, or 
propane used as refrigerant passing through a heat exchanger, the releases adopt the 
process conditions given by the equipment involved. 
The released is assumed to happen during a 10min time span.   
The results obtained from following the parameters established by the regulation 
were compared against the worst case scenario proposed by Crowl and Louvar [14]. The 
authors proposed a wind speed of 1.5 m/s instead the 2.0 m/s identified by the NFPA. 
Additionally, two different terminal locations were selected (Maryland and Louisiana) in 
order to check how the specific ambient conditions of two coastal areas located at 
different latitudes may affect the vapor dispersion calculations.  
 
7.1 NFPA 59A based simulation 
The definition of the exclusion zones, required by the regulation, was performed 
for seven scenarios. These seven scenarios represent the process conditions at a medium 
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size regasification or liquefaction LNG train.  Different pressures and temperatures, 
consistent to the expected materials conditions at each process stage were considered. 
For instance, when the model required for modeling a release of methane at its liquid 
stage, the selected modeling temperature was below -256°F. 
Table 4. Release scenarios 
Terminal 
Material Import Export State 
Methane x x Gas 
Methane x x Liquid 
CO2 x Gas 
Propane x Liquid 
Propane x Gas 
MR x Liquid 
MR x Gas 
Figure 2. shows a vapor cloud side view of a Methane release with the identification of 
the different concentrations. 
Figure 2. LNG dispersion 
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The exclusion zone is calculated based on the ½ LFL downwind distances. From 
the previous figure it can be observed that methane tends to flow upward, and this is 
consistent with its lighter weight in comparison to air. 
 
Table 5. Release scenarios (LNG, CO2) 
Composition State 
Concentration 
(ppm) 
Hole 
size 
(in) 
Speed 
(m/s) 
Stability 
Class 
Distance 
(m) 
Methane Gas 2500 
0.5 
1.5 F 17 
2 F 16.5 
7 D 12 
2 
1.5 F 90 
2 F 88 
7 D 72 
4 
1.5 F 200 
2 F 200 
7 D 175 
Methane Liquid 2500 
0.5 
1.5 F 31 
2 F 26 
7 D 8 
2 
1.5 F 215 
2 F 196 
7 D 67 
4 
1.5 F 460 
2 F 450 
7 D 120 
Carbon 
Dioxide 
Gas 5000 
0.5 
1.5 F 7 
2 F 6.6 
7 D 5 
2 
1.5 F 35 
2 F 33 
7 D 15.5 
4 
1.5 F 95 
2 F 93 
7 D 64 
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Table 6. Release scenarios (Propane) 
Composition State 
Concentration 
(ppm) 
Hole 
size 
(in) 
Wind 
Speed (m/s) 
Stability 
Class 
Distance 
(m) 
Propane Gas 21000 
0.5 
1.5 F 5.5 
2 F 5.5 
7 D 4.8 
2 
1.5 F 22 
2 F 22 
7 D 17 
4 
1.5 F 52 
2 F 52 
7 D 46 
Propane Liquid 21000 
0.5 
1.5 F 4.2 
2 F 4.2 
7 D 3.6 
2 
1.5 F 16 
2 F 15.8 
7 D 12.5 
4 
1.5 F 36 
2 F 35 
7 D 28 
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Table 7. Release scenarios (MR) 
Composition State 
Concentration 
(ppm) 
Hole 
size 
(in) 
Wind 
Speed (m/s) 
Stability 
Class 
Distance 
(m) 
Mixed 
Refrigerant 
Gas 31521 
0.5 
1.5 F 6.5 
2 F 6.5 
7 D 5.7 
2 
1.5 F 28 
2 F 27.6 
7 D 22 
4 
1.5 F 65 
2 F 65 
7 D 61 
Mixed 
Refrigerant 
Liquid 27299 
0.5 
1.5 F 50 
2 F 49 
7 D 17 
2 
1.5 F 320 
2 F 295 
7 D 150 
4 
1.5 F 650 
2 F 640 
7 D 310 
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Figure 3. Dispersion parameters comparison (Methane)  
 
 
Figure 4. Dispersion parameters comparison (CO2)  
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Figure 5. Dispersion parameters comparison (Propane)  
 
 
Figure 6. Dispersion parameters comparison (Mixed Refrigerant)  
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In the bar diagrams we can observe that the difference between NFPA 59A (2.0 
F) parameters and the worst case scenario proposed by Crowl and Louvar (1.5 F) is 
relatively imperceptible [14]. However, when we evaluate the dispersion based on a 7 
m/s wind speed and a stability class D that are common for coastal areas, the distance 
calculated are more severely affected [15].  
 
7.2 Location based simulation 
At this stage, the parameters proposed by the NFPA 59A for wind speed (2.0 
m/s) and stability class F have been selected. What is intended, is to incorporate the 
particular ambient conditions for Maryland and Louisiana (relative humidity and 
ambient temperature) in order to compare how can be affected the dispersion distance by 
these specific location characteristics. 
 
Table 8. Location parameters 
Terminal Location 
Relative 
Humidity 
Ambient 
Temperature 
(°F) 
Cove Point Maryland 0.8 57.4 
Sabine Pass Louisiana 0.9 68.5 
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Table 9. Release scenarios based on location 
Composition State 
Con. 
(ppm) 
Hole size 
(in) 
Louisiana Maryland 
Methane Gas 2500 
0.5 16.5 16.5 
2 95 95 
4 200 210 
Methane Liquid 2500 
0.5 24 22 
2 195 205 
4 380 400 
Carbon 
Dioxide 
Gas 30000 
0.5 1.6 1.5 
2 6 6 
4 12 12 
Carbon 
Dioxide 
Gas 50000 
0.5 1 0.9 
2 3.5 3.5 
4 7.5 7 
Propane Liquid 21000 
0.5 5.5 5.5 
2 22 22 
4 52 51 
Propane Gas 21000 
0.5 4.1 4.1 
2 15.9 15.5 
4 36 35 
Mixed 
Refrigerant 
Gas 31521 
0.5 6.6 6.6 
2 27 27 
4 65 65 
Mixed 
Refrigerant 
Liquid 27299 
0.5 46 46 
2 295 290 
4 649 625 
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Figure 7. Dispersion location parameters comparison (Methane)  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Dispersion location parameters comparison (CO2)  
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Figure 9. Dispersion location parameters comparison (Propane)  
 
 
 
Figure 10. Dispersion location parameters comparison (Mixed Refrigerant)  
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From the results it is possible to identify that the variation on the dispersion 
distances based on the ambient conditions for each location would not represent a 
substantial impact. 
 
7.3 Results representation on GIS 
            The main intention of using GIS for the representation of the results was to 
minimize the gap between the technical safety aspects (such as flammable dispersions) 
and the applicability of the results in a real world environment. First it is required to 
understand why the LNG terminals are located at those particular cities.  
From the following map, it is possible to identify the large concentration of tight 
gas plays in Texas, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia (considering just those 
that have influenced the construction of LNG Terminals). 
 
 
Figure 11. Approved LNG export terminals 
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Figure 12. Natural gas consumption-production by state 
Based on the information provided by the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), it is possible to understand the relation between the consumption and production 
of natural gas by each state. Texas and Pennsylvania are the states with greater relation 
production-consumption. Cove Point LNG terminal is the facility that provides the 
opportunity for exporting LNG to the north east states. 
Figure 13. Interstate natural gas pipeline network 
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The pipeline density is highly concentrated at Texas and Louisiana. Several 
oceanic pipelines are connected to the offshore wells. 
Figure 14. Accidents 2015 interstate natural gas pipeline network 
During the 2015, the interstate natural gas pipeline accidents that presented a 
greater number of fatalities were located at the northeast region. 
Figure 15. Cove Point, Maryland LNG terminal 
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Figure 16. Cove Point dispersion analysis 
 
 
Figure 17. Sabine Pass dispersion analysis 
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Based on the vapor cloud dispersion calculations, it was possible to identify that 
the Cove Point facility may affect the nearby populated areas. 
The integrated information related to areas under flooding hazards, population 
density, and natural gas pipelines might be helpful for assessing the potential negative 
consequences that might affect the LNG terminals. 
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 8. CONCLUSIONS  
 
8.1 Conclusions 
 The parameters established by the NFPA 59A for the assessment of exclusion 
zones provided the maximum downwind distances, in contrast with the parameters 
proposed for coastal areas. The results showed that a difference in wind speed of 0.5 m/s 
might be neglected. No radical changes were found between the NFPA parameters and 
those established by Crowl and Louvar for a potential worst case scenario. 
Although this may represent that the results for the exclusion zones are overestimated, 
the nearby population has less chances for being affected by an accidental release of 
flammable materials. 
The most critical event evaluated was related to the mixed hydrocarbon 
refrigerant. Based on the results for vapor cloud dispersion, and the dimensions of the 
potential facilities, the LFL is allowed to transport hazardous material beyond the 
facilities’ boundary limit.  
The most influential parameter was identified as the wind speed. The effects of a 
high wind speed may contribute with a faster dilution of the vapor cloud. Therefore, the 
estimation of the overall negative consequences would be inferior for average coastal 
areas, than those assessed for more calm ambient conditions.  
Two different terminals were assessed for seven scenarios related to liquefaction 
and regasification terminals. The results shown no major variability when the relative 
humidity and ambient temperature differ from one facility to another one. 
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Although each LNG terminal might be designed for the specific characteristics of 
the natural gas received at the inlet pipeline, this analyzes represent an opportunity for 
getting a preliminary idea of the consequences that the plant would generate. 
The integration of heavier hydrocarbons such as propane undeniably represents 
an increase of the potential negative outcomes. The modification of the existing LNG 
import facilities, will require a thoroughly analysis in order to minimize the results of an 
undesired event. 
Evidently the complexities in terms of hazardous materials, and more processing 
equipment allow us to affirm that LNG export terminals represent a more challenging 
scenario. 
  
8.2 Future work 
In order to evaluate the potential damages on the facility due to an explosion, as 
the one occurred in Skikda, Algeria, it is necessary to find a simplified method for 
analyzing the congestion zones and its subsequent blast overpressure effects. 
The integration of GIS material will allow the understanding on a bigger portion of the 
whole LNG chain. Information regarding the allocation of the pipelines in relation with 
the population proximity should be studied. 
Also, GIS might be useful for analyzing the ship cargoes potential consequences. 
These types of ships, in some cases must sail across dense populated harbors. It would 
be interesting to analyze the potential benefits for using FPSO instead of onshore 
terminals.   
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